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Abstract
Bundle Adjustment is a widely adopted self-calibration
technique that allows to estimate scene structure and cam-
era parameters at once. Typically this happens by itera-
tively minimizing the reprojection error between a set of 2D
stereo correspondences and their predicted 3D positions.
This optimization is almost invariantly carried out by means
of the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm, which is very sen-
sitive to the presence of outliers in the input data. For this
reason many structure-from-motion techniques adopt some
inlier selection algorithm. This usually happens both in the
initial feature matching step and by pruning matches with
larger reprojection error after an initial optimization. While
this works well in many scenarios, outliers that are not fil-
tered before the optimization can still lead to wrong param-
eter estimation or even prevent convergence. In this pa-
per we introduce a novel stereo correspondences selection
schema that exploits Game Theory in order to perform a ro-
bust inlier selection before any optimization step. The prac-
tical effectiveness of the proposed approach is confirmed by
an extensive set of experiments and comparisons with state-
of-the-art techniques.
1. Introduction
The selection of 2D point correspondences is arguably
the most important step in image based multi-view recon-
struction. As a matter of fact, differently from techniques
augmented by structured light or known markers, wrong
initial correspondences can lead to sub-optimal parameter
estimation or, in the worst cases, to the inability of the opti-
mization algorithm to obtain a feasible solution. For this
reason reconstruction approaches adopt several specially
crafted expedients to avoid as much as possible the inclu-
sion of outliers. In the first place correspondences are not
searched throughout all the image plane, but only points that
are both repeatable and well characterized are considered.
This selection is carried out by means of interest point de-
tectors and feature descriptors. Salient points are localized
with sub-pixel accuracy by general detectors, such as Harris
Operator [2] and Difference of Gaussians [7], or by using
techniques that are able to locate affine invariant regions,
such as Maximally Stable Extremal Regions (MSER) [8]
and Hessian-Affine [9]. The affine invariance property is
desirable since the change in appearance of a scene region
after a small camera motion can be locally approximated
with an affine transformation. Once interesting points are
found, they must be matched to form the candidate pairs
to be fed to the bundle adjustment algorithm. Most of the
currently used techniques for point matching are based on
the computation of some affine invariant feature descriptor.
Specifically, to each point is assigned a descriptor vector
with tens to hundreds of dimensions, a scale and a rotation
value. Among the most used feature descriptor algorithms
are the Scale-Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) [6, 5], the
Speeded Up Robust Features (SURF) [3], the Gradient Lo-
cation and Orientation Histogram (GLOH) [10] and more
recently the Local Energy based Shape Histogram (LESH)
[11]. In all of these techniques, the descriptor vector itself
is robust with respect to affine trasformations: i.e., similar
image regions exhibit descriptor vectors with small mutual
Euclidean distance. This property is used to match each
point with the candidate that is associated to the nearest de-
scriptor vector. If the descriptor is not distinctive enough
this approach is prone to select many outliers. A common
optimization involves the definition of a maximum thresh-
old over the distance ratio between the first and the second
nearest neighbors. In addition, points that are matched mul-
tiple times are deemed as ambiguous and discarded (i.e.,
one-to-one matching is enforced). Another common heuris-
tic for the elimination of erroneous matches is to exclude
points that exhibit a large reprojection error after a first
round of Levenberg-Marquardt optimization [4] (see for in-
stance [14]). Unfortunately this afterthought is based upon
an error estimation that depends on the point pairs chosen
beforehand; this leads to a quandary that can only be solved
by avoiding wrong matches from the start. In this paper we
introduce a robust matching technique that allows to oper-
ate a very accurate inlier selection at an early stage of the
process and without any need to rely on 3D reprojection.
In the experimental section, to assess the advantages of our
approach, we present a comprehensive set of comparisons
between the results delivered by our technique and those
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obtained with a reference implementation of the structure-
from-motion system presented in [13] and [14].
2. Game-Theoretic Point Pairs Selection
The selection of matching points on behalf of the fea-
ture descriptor is only able to exploit local information.
This limitation conflicts with the richness of information
that is embedded in the scene structure. For instance, un-
der the assumption of rigidity and small camera motion,
intuition suggests that features that are close in one view
cannot be too far apart in the other one. Further, if a pair
of features exhibit a certain difference of angles or ratio of
scales, this relation should be maintained among their re-
spective matches. Our basic idea is to formalize this intu-
itive notion of consistency between pairs of feature matches
into a real-valued utility function and to find a large set of
matches that express a high level of mutual compatibility.
Of course, the ability to define a meaningful pairwise util-
ity function and a reliable technique for finding a consistent
set as large as possible is paramount for the effectiveness
of the approach. Following [15, 1], we model the matching
process in a game-theoretic framework, where two players
extracted from a large population select a pair of matching
points from two images. The player then receives a pay-
off from the other players proportional to how compatible
his match is with respect to the other player’s choice, where
the compatibility derives from some utility function that re-
wards pairs of matches that are consistent. In Section 2.2
such a function will be proposed, but in practice many dif-
ferent choices can be made: for instance it is possible to
assign a high payoff to pairs of matches that preserve the
distance between source and destination points and a low
payoff otherwise. Clearly, it is in each player’s interest to
pick matches that are compatible with those the other play-
ers are likely to choose. In general, as the game is repeated,
players will adapt their behavior to prefer matchings that
yield larger payoffs, driving all inconsistent hypotheses to
extinction, and settling for an equilibrium where the pool
of matches from which the players are still actively select-
ing their associations forms a cohesive set with high mu-
tual support. Within this formulation, the solutions of the
matching problem correspond to evolutionary stable states
(ESS’s), a robust population-based generalization of the no-
tion of a Nash equilibrium. In a sense, this matching process
can be seen as a contextual voting system, where each time
the game is repeated the previous selections of the other
players affect the future vote of each player in an attempt
to reach consensus. This way the evolving context brings
global information into the selection process.
2.1. Non-cooperative Games
Originated in the early 40’s, Game Theory was an at-
tempt to formalize a system characterized by the actions of
entities with competing objectives, which is thus hard to
characterize with a single objective function [16]. Accord-
ing to this view, the emphasis shifts from the search of a
local optimum to the definition of equilibria between op-
posing forces. In this setting multiple players have at their
disposal a set of strategies and their goal is to maximize a
payoff that depends also on the strategies adopted by other
players. Evolutionary game theory originated in the early
70’s as an attempt to apply the principles and tools of game
theory to biological contexts. Evolutionary game theory
considers an idealized scenario where pairs of individuals
are repeatedly drawn at random from a large population to
play a two-player game. In contrast to traditional game-
theoretic models, players are not supposed to behave ratio-
nally, but rather they act according to a pre-programmed be-
havior, or mixed strategy. It is supposed that some selection
process operates over time on the distribution of behaviors
favoring players that receive higher payoffs.
More formally, let O = {1, · · · , n} be the set of avail-
able strategies (pure strategies in the language of game the-
ory), and C = (cij) be a matrix specifying the payoff that
an individual playing strategy i receives against someone
playing strategy j. A mixed strategy is a probability dis-
tribution x = (x1, . . . , xn)T over the available strategies
O. Clearly, mixed strategies are constrained to lie in the
n-dimensional standard simplex
∆n =
{
x ∈ IRn : xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ 1 . . . n,
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
}
.
The support of a mixed strategy x ∈ ∆, denoted by σ(x),
is defined as the set of elements chosen with non-zero prob-
ability: σ(x) = {i ∈ O | xi > 0}. The expected payoff re-
ceived by a player choosing element i when playing against
a player adopting a mixed strategy x is (Cx)i =
∑
j cijxj ,
hence the expected payoff received by adopting the mixed
strategy y against x is yTCx. The best replies against
mixed strategy x is the set of mixed strategies
β(x) = {y ∈ ∆ | yTCx = max
z
(zTCx)} .
A strategy x is said to be a Nash equilibrium if it is the best
reply to itself, i.e., ∀y ∈ ∆, xTCx ≥ yTCx . This implies
that ∀i ∈ σ(x) we have (Cx)i = xTCx; that is, the payoff
of every strategy in the support of x is constant.
A strategy x is said to be an evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS) if it is a Nash equilibrium and
∀y ∈ ∆ xTCx = yTCx⇒ xTCy > yTCy . (1)
This condition guarantees that any deviation from the stable
strategies does not pay.
2.2. Matching Strategies and Payoffs
Central to this framework is the definition of a matching
game, which implies the definition of the strategies avail-
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Figure 1. The payoff between two matching strategies is inversely
proportional to the maximum reprojection error obtained by ap-
plying the affine transformation estimated by a match to the other.
able to the players and of the payoffs related to these strate-
gies. Given a set M of feature points in a source image and
a set D of potentially corresponding features in a destina-
tion image, we call a matching strategy any pair (a1, a2)
with a1 ∈ M and a2 ∈ D. We call the set of all the match-
ing strategies S. In principle, all the features extracted by an
interest point detector could be used to build the matching
strategies set, thus leading to a size of the set S that grows
quadratically with the average number of features detected
in an image. In practice, however, in Section 2.3 we adopt
some heuristics that allow us to obtain good overall results
with a much smaller set. Once S has been selected, our goal
becomes to extract from it the largest subset that includes
only correctly matched points: that is, strategies that asso-
ciate a feature in the source image with the same feature in
the destination image. To this extent, it is necessary to de-
fine a payoff function Π : S × S → R+ that exploits some
pairwise information available at this early stage (i.e. be-
fore estimating camera and scene parameters). Since scale
and rotation are associated to each feature, it seems natural
to try to use this information to enforce coherence between
matching strategies. Specifically, we are able to associate
to each matching strategy (a1, a2) one and only one sim-
ilarity transformation, that we call T (a1, a2). When this
transformation is applied to a1 it produces the point a2, but
when applied to the source point b1 of the matching strat-
egy (b1, b2) it does not need to produce b2. In fact it will
produce b2 if and only if T (a1, a2) = T (b1, b2), otherwise
it will give a point b′2 that is as near to b2 as the transforma-
tion T (a1, a2) is similar to T (b1, b2). Given two matching
strategies (a1, a2) and (b1, b2) and their respective associ-
ated similarities T (a1, a2) and T (b1, b2), we calculate their
reciprocal reprojected points as:
a′2 = T (b1, b2)a1
b′2 = T (a1, a2)b1
That is, the virtual points obtained by applying to each
source point the similarity transformation associated to the
other match (see Fig. 1). Thus, given virtual points a′2 and
b′2, the payoff between (a1, a2) and (b1, b2) is:
Π((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) = e−λmax(|a2−a
′
2|,|b2−b′2|) (2)
where λ is a selectivity parameter that allows to operate a
more or less strict inlier selection. If λ is small, then the
payoff function (and thus the matching) is more tolerant,
otherwise the evolutionary process becomes more selective
as λ grows. We define 2 as a similarity enforcing payoff
function and we call a matching game any symmetric non-
cooperative game that involves a matching strategies set S
and a similarity enforcing payoff function Π.
The rationale of the payoff function proposed in equa-
tion 2 is that, while by changing point of view the similarity
relationship between features is not maintained (as the ob-
ject is not planar and the transformation is projective), we
can expect the transformation to be a similarity at least “lo-
cally”. This means that we aim to extract clusters of feature
matches that belong to the same region of the object and
that tend to lie in the same level of depth. While this could
seem to be an unsound assumption for general camera mo-
tion, in the experimental section we will show that it holds
well with the typical disparity found in standard multiple
view and stereo data sets. Further it should be noted that
with large camera motion most, if not all, commonly used
feature detectors fail, thus any inlier selection attempt be-
comes meaningless. One final note should be made about
one-to-one matching. Since each source feature can corre-
spond with at most one destination point, it is desirable to
avoid any kind of multiple match. It is easy to show that
a pair of strategies with zero mutual payoff cannot belong
to the support of an ESS (see [1]), thus any payoff function
Π can be easily adapted to enforce one-to-one matching by
defining:
Π′ =
{
Π((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) if a1 6= b1 and a2 6= b2
0 otherwise
(3)
We can define 3 as a one-to-one similarity enforcing payoff
function.
2.3. Building the Matching Strategies Set
From a theoretical point of view the total number of
matching strategies can be as large as the Cartesian product
of the sets of features detected in the images. Since most
interest point detectors extract thousands of features from
an image and the size of the payoff matrix grows quadrat-
ically with the number of matching strategies, this leads
to problems too large to be managed in an efficient way.
While the feature descriptor has not been used to define the
payoff function Π, it could be useful to reduce the num-
ber of matching strategies considered. Specifically, for each
source feature we can generate k matching strategies that
connect it to the k destination features that are the nearest
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Figure 2. An example of the evolutionary process. Four feature points are extracted from two images and a total of six matching strategies
are selected as initial hypotheses. The matrix Π shows the compatibilities between pairs of matching strategies according to a one-
to-one similarity-enforcing payoff function. Each matching strategy got zero payoff with itself and with strategies that share the same
source or destination point (i.e., Π((b1, b2), (c1, b2)) = 0). Strategies that are coherent with respect to similarity transformation exhibit
high payoff values (i.e., Π((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) = 1 and pi((a1, a2), (d1, d2)) = 0.9)), while less compatible pairs get lower scores (i.e.,
pi((a1, a2), (c1, c2)) = 0.1). Initially (at T=0) the population is set to the barycenter of the simplex and slightly perturbed. After just one
iteration, (c1, b2) and (c1, c2) have lost a significant amount of support, while (d1, c2) and (d1, d2) are still played by a sizable amount of
population. After ten iterations (T=10) (d1, d2) has finally prevailed over (d1, c2) (note that the two are mutually exclusive). Note that in
the final population ((a1, a2), (b1, b2)) have a higher support than (d1, d2) since they are a little more coherent with respect to similarity.
in terms of descriptor distance. Since our game-theoretic
approach operates inlier selection regardless of the descrip-
tor, we do not need to set any threshold with respect to
the absolute descriptor distance or the distinctiveness be-
tween the first and the second nearest point. In this sense,
the only constraint that we need to impose over k is that it
should be high enough to allow the correct correspondence
to be among the candidates a significative percentage of the
times. In the experimental section we will analyze the in-
fluence of k over the quality of the matches obtained.
2.4. Evolving to an Optimal Solution
The search for a stable state is performed by simulat-
ing the evolution of a natural selection process. Under very
loose conditions, any dynamics that respect the payoffs is
guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibria [16] and (hope-
fully) to ESS’s; for this reason, the choice of an actual se-
lection process is not crucial and can be driven mostly by
considerations of efficiency and simplicity. We chose to use
the replicator dynamics, a well-known formalization of the
selection process governed by the following equation
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t)
(Cx(t))i
x(t)TCx(t)
(4)
where xi is the i-th element of the population and C the
payoff matrix. Once the population has reached a local
maximum, all the non-extincted mating strategies can be
considered valid (see Fig. 2). In practice strategies are ex-
tincted only after an infinite number of iterations. Since we
halt the evolution when the population ceases to change sig-
nificantly, it is necessary to introduce some criteria to dis-
tinguish correct from non-correct matches. To avoid a hard
threshold we chose to keep as valid all the strategies played
by a population amount exceeding a percentage of the most
popular strategy. We call this percentage quality threshold.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, each evolution process selects
a group of matching strategies that are coherent with respect
to a local similarity transformation. This means that if we
want to cover a large portion of the subject we need to iter-
ate many times and prune the previously selected matches
at each new start. Obviously, after all the depth levels have
been swept, small and not significant residual groups start to
emerge from the evolution. To avoid the selection of these
spurious matches we fixed a minimum cardinality for each
valid group. We call this cardinality group size.
3. Experimental Results
We conducted different sets of experiments. Our first
goal was to analyze the impact of the algorithm parameters,
namely λ, k, quality threshold and group size, over the qual-
ity of the results obtained. For this purpose we used a pair of
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Figure 3. Analysis of the performance of the approach with respect to variation of the parameters of the algorithm.
cameras previously calibrated through a standard procedure
and took stereo pictures of 20 different, isolated objects;
then, we investigated the influence of the four parameters
separately. For each test we evaluated three quality mea-
sures: the average reprojection error in pixels () and the
differences in radians between the (calibrated) ground-truth
and respectively the estimated rotation angle (∆α) and rota-
tion axis (∆γ). In addition, each stereo pair was processed
with the keymatcher included in the structure-from-motion
suite Bundler [13, 14]. Finally, the correspondences pro-
duced by both the Bundler keymatcher and our technique
were given as an input to the bundle adjustment procedure
included in the suite. This allows to obtain a fair compar-
ison of the two approaches, whose quality parameters can
be directly compared, being the result of running the same
optimizer on different inputs. In Fig. 3 we reported the
results of these experiments. The first row shows the ef-
fect of the selectivity parameter λ. As expected both a too
low and a too high value lead to less satisfactory results,
mainly with respect to the estimation of the angle between
the two cameras. This is probably due respectively to a too
tight and a too relaxed enforcement of local coherence. The
three rows below show the impact of the number of can-
didate matches for each source point, the quality threshold
that a match must exceed to be considered feasible and the
minimum size of a valid group. Overall, these experiments
suggest that those parameters have little influence over the
quality of the result, notwithstanding the Game-Theoretic
approach achieves better results in nearly every case.
For the purpose of exploring further the differences be-
tween our technique and the Bundler keymatcher, we in-
vestigated in depth four cases. We will describe them here
in two separate sets. The first set of unordered images
comes from the ”DinoRing” and ”TempleRing” sequences
from the Middlebury Multi-View Stereo dataset [12]; for
these models, camera parameters are provided and used as
a ground-truth. The second set is composed of two cali-
brated stereo scenes selected from the previously acquired
collection, specifically a statue of Ganesha and a handful of
screws placed on a table. It should be noted however that
Bundler did not find a feasible matching for many stereo
pairs in the collection. Again, for all the sets of experi-
ments we evaluated both the rotation error of all the cam-
eras in terms of angular distance and axis discrepancy, and
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Dino sequence Temple sequence
Game-Theoretic Bundler Keymatcher Game-Theoretic Bundler Keymatcher
Matches 14573 9245 25785 22317
 ≤ 1 pix 24.83 6.49406 22.6049 24.6729
≤ 5 pix 54.94 48.3659 62.7737 61.8957
≥ 5 pix 20.21 45.1401 14.6214 13.4314
Avg. 2.3086 4.5255 2.3577 2.3732
∆α Avg. 0.005751 0.005561 0.010514 0.009376
S. dev. 0.003242 0.003184 0.005282 0.004646
Max 0.012057 0.011475 0.021527 0.017016
∆γ Avg. 0.008313 0.009561 0.014050 0.014079
S. dev. 0.002948 0.006738 0.000511 0.000825
Max 0.013449 0.030661 0.014692 0.015442
Avg. levels 8.42 - 9.27 -
Figure 4. Results obtained with two multiple view data sets (image best viewed in color).
the reprojection error of the detected keypoints. The aver-
age number of matching groups is also given for the Game-
Theoretic method.
The “Dino” model is a difficult case in general, as it em-
bodies very few features; the upper part of Fig. 4 shows the
correspondences produced by our method (left column) in
comparison with the other matcher (right column). A set
of optimal parameters detected in the previous experiments
was used for configuring our matcher. This resulted as ex-
pected in the detection of many correct matches organized
in groups, each corresponding to a different level of depth,
and visualized with a unique color in the figure. As can be
seen, different levels of depth are properly estimated; this is
particularly evident throughout the arched back going from
the tail (in foreground) to the head of the model (in back-
ground), where clustered sets of keypoints follow one after
the other. Furthermore, these sets of interest points maintain
the right correspondences within the pair of images. The
Bundler keymatcher on the other hand, while still achieving
good results in the whole process, also outputs erroneous
correspondences (marked in the figure).
The quality of reconstruction following the application
of both methods can be visually compared by looking at the
distribution of the reprojection error in the left half of Fig.
6. While most reprojections fall within 1-3 pixels of dis-
tance for the Game-Theoretic approach, the Bundler key-
matcher exhibits a long-tail trend, reaching an error spread
of 20 pixels. Differently from “Dino”, the “Temple” model
is quite rich of features; for visualization purposes we only
show a subset of the detected matches for both the tech-
niques. While the effectiveness of our approach is not neg-
atively impacted by the model characteristics, mismatches
are revealed with Bundler. In particular, the symmetric parts
of the object (mainly represented by the pillars) result in
very similar features and this causes the matcher to estab-
lish one-to-many pairings over them. However, it should be
noted that for both the “Dino” and “Temple” models the two
matchers deliver comparably good results when fed with a
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Ganesha stereo Screws stereo
Game-Theoretic Bundler Keymatcher Game-Theoretic Bundler Keymatcher
Matches 280 200 211 46
 ≤ 1 pix 98.2824 20 0 0
≤ 5 pix 1.7175 80 34.7716 6.75676
≥ 5 pix 0 0 65.2284 93.2432
Avg. 0.321248 1.67583 5.86237 10.2208
∆α 0.001014 0.007424 0.020822 0.030995
∆γ 0.048076 0.078715 0.106485 0.117885
Levels 14 - 12 -
Figure 5. Results obtained with two stereo view data sets (image best viewed in color).
whole set of views of the object.
In the calibrated stereo scenario, ”Ganesha stereo” im-
ages are rich of distinctive features and should pose no dif-
ficulty to any of the methods. The Bundler keymatcher pro-
vides very good results, with only one evident false match
out of a total of 200 matches (see Fig. 5). The resulting
bundle adjustment is quite accurate, giving very small ro-
tation errors and reprojection distances. Nevertheless, our
method performs considerably better: reprojection errors
dramatically decrease, with around 98 percent of the key-
points falling below one pixel of reprojection distance.
The second calibrated stereo scene, ”Screws stereo”, is
an emblematic case and provides some meaningful insight.
The images depict a dozen of screws standing on a table,
placed by hand at different levels of depth. This configura-
tion, together with the abundance of features in the objects
themselves, should provide enough information for the two
algorithms to extract significant matches. Indeed, the scene
proves to be a difficult one due to the very nature of the
objects depicted, which are all identical and highly symmet-
ric, and diverse false matches are established by the Bundler
keymatcher (see the last column of Fig. 5). This matching
results nevertheless in a good estimation of the rigid trans-
formation linking the two cameras, since erroneous pairings
are removed a posteriori during the subsequent phases of
bundle adjustment. By contrast, the Game-Theoretic ap-
proach outputs large and accurate sets of matches, roughly
one per object, each corresponding to a level of depth; even
moderately difficult cases, such as the left-right “swaps”
due to the change of viewpoint taking place at the borders,
are correctly dealt with. Again, a histogram of the reprojec-
tion error for this object is shown in Fig. 6.
Execution times for the matching steps of our technique
are plotted in Fig. 7; the scatter plot shows a substantially
linear growth of convergence time as the number of match-
ing strategies increases, staying below half a second even
with a large number of players.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a novel game-theoretic tech-
nique that performs an accurate feature matching between
multiple views of the same subject as a preliminary step for
bundle adjustment. Differently from other approaches, we
do not rely on a first estimation of scene and camera param-
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Figure 6. Distribution of the reprojection error on one multiple view (left) and one stereo pair (right) example.
eters in order to obtain a robust inlier selection. Rather, we
enforce local compatibility of groups of features with re-
spect to a common similarity transformation. By extracting
one group at a time by means of an evolutive process, we
are able to cover the entire subject. Experimental compar-
isons with a widely used technique show the ability of our
approach to obtain a tighter inlier selection and thus a more
accurate estimation of the scene parameters.
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